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In “Monty Python’s Life of Brian,” a Judean leader tries to stoke a rebellion against the Romans. 
He tells a small crowd, “They’ve bled us white, the bastards,” and asks his comrades, “What 
have the Romans done for us?” 
The other men reply by cataloging Rome’s great building projects, transportation 
networks, and bureaucratic systems. The agitator, played by John Cleese, responds: “All right, 
but apart from the sanitation, the medicine, education, wine, public order, irrigation, roads, a 
fresh water system, and public health, what have the Romans ever done for us?” 
I have always found the scene slyly resonant yet deeply inadequate. The idea that an 
imperial power constructs the groundwork for civilization must have been familiar to the 
members of Monty Python—all of whom were educated at British institutions that once trained 
men to rule the colonies. In its celebration of empire, the scene says nothing about how these 
collateral benefits were first and foremost designed to extract resources from the colonies and 
move soldiers and materiel needed to rule them. It ignores the way militaries use infrastructure to 
pacify intransigent populations and incorporate conquered peoples and places into global 
systems of rule. 
The Talmudic passage on which the “Life of Brian” scene is based is more revealing. In 
the Tractate Shabbat, 33b, Rebbe Judah praises the works of the Romans: “They have made 
streets, they have built bridges, they have erected baths.” Rebbe Simon counters: “All that they 
made they made for themselves; they built market-places, to set harlots in them; baths, to 
rejuvenate themselves; bridges, to levy tolls for them.” What the Talmud makes clear is that the 
social benefits of infrastructure were secondary effects of empire building. 
Across time, this centrality of logistics has proven crucial to the work of conquest. 
Napoleon, for instance, was successful not only because he had a great strategic mind, 
but also because he had an administrative apparatus that ensured trains could supply his army 
from behind the lines. In fact, according to military historian Martin van Creveld, Napoleon was 
the first European leader to send commissionaires ahead of the military “in order to organize the 
resources of this or that town and set up a market.” In Russia, Napoleon’s failure was caused as 
much by a rare flaw in his logistical planning—locals seized the goods needed to support his 
frontline troops—as the exigencies of battle. 
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Throughout history and in all continents when armies have marched across continents, a 
crowd roughly 50 to 150 percent their size followed. These civilians reshaped local economies as 
they provided militaries with a range of commercial services that included repairing weapons, 
provisioning food, mending clothing, and sex work. 
From Napoleon until the current day, the diffusion and proliferation of roads, markets, 
and civilian institutions have gone hand in hand with fighting battles. Wars, while destructive, 
are often the engines of economic and political transformations—many of which are not 
immediately visible. Military historians, for example, trace the emergence of the vast network of 
railroads across Western Europe to the logistics lines that fed the different sides of European 
wars fought by the French and Prussians throughout the 19th century. The extensive highway 
system in the U.S. incorporated old supply lines used during the Indian Wars that fed and clothed 
the settlers and conquerors of indigenous lands. Even today, the impetus for the construction of 
roads and highways in the U.S. often comes from the necessary infrastructural support demanded 
by the Department of Defense. A 1956 U.S. law established the National System of Interstate 
and Defense Highways, which facilitated the movement of troops and military equipment across 
the U.S.  Many of the best roads in the U.S. are still those serving defense and aerospace 
manufacturers in the South and Northwest. 
“Civilization” 
As well as being a tool to bring conquered populations to heel, roads have long been seen as 
markers of societal development. One of the clearest articulations of this view comes from 
Mareshal Bugeaud, who invaded and colonized Algeria in the 19th century. In his assessment of 
his Algerian adversaries, Bugeaud claimed that Arabs “have none of these major centers of 
government, population, and commerce at the heart of a civilized country nor any of those large 
arteries that circulate the life of civilized nations: no inland points, no major roads, no factories, 
no villages, nor farms.” 
Roads, markets, and schools in particular were seen as vectors of civilization—the trinity 
that would allow the incorporation and pacification of indigenous populations. Hubert Lyautey, 
who helped conquer Indochina (1894-1897), Madagascar (1897-1902), and Morocco 
(intermittently and in different roles from 1903 until 1925), similarly acclaimed roads as 
instruments of cultural advancement. In Morocco, Lyautey boasted of building about 1,000 miles 
of new roads to connect Morocco to Algeria and Tunisia and seaports to inland cities, integrating 
Morocco into French colonial administrative and security systems. 
The construction process itself is an extraordinary way to transform labor regimes. In 
Madagascar, where communal and village labor was mostly agricultural, France created a 
proletariat forced into corvée labor to build roads. From the colonizing power’s first actions, it 
created racialized work regimes where, of all the peoples of Madagascar, the Malagasy were 
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exploited for road construction. The racial hierarchies created in this system persisted long after 
the French decamped. 
Hearts and minds 
Most of today’s wars are neither the pitched battles of the Napoleonic era nor colonial invasions. 
This is an age of counterinsurgencies, yet these “small wars” nearly always require large 
infrastructure investments. Counterinsurgencies are asymmetrical (one side has more superior 
firepower) and unconventional (a formal military fights an unconventional or guerrilla force). 
Because guerrilla forces cannot survive without the day-to-day support of civilian populations 
(who provide food, shelter, or information), counterinsurgencies are as much about winning over 
local populations as they are about the military defeat of insurgents. 
In a 2006 essay published in Military Review, the Australian guru of U.S. 
counterinsurgency Lt. Col. David Kilcullen argued that interfacing with civilians is essential to 
counterinsurgencies: 
This is the true meaning of the phrase “hearts and minds,” which comprises two separate 
components. “Hearts” means persuading people their best interests are served by your 
success; “minds” means convincing them that you can protect them and that resisting you 
is pointless. Note that neither concept has to do with whether people like you. Calculated 
self-interest, not emotion, is what counts. 
To convince residents that an occupying force is in their best interest, the logistics of 
counterinsurgency are as significant as the actual fighting. This is not only because the 
transportation of goods and materiel sustains forces or are what sometimes remains after the war 
(as the Roman aqueducts did), but because the very process of logistics provision does vital 
political work. 
The two modern examples I want to speak about are Afghanistan and Palestine. In both 
locations—as in dozens of countries where counterinsurgencies have been fought—roads and 
other infrastructure projects don’t simply serve tactical or immediate military functions. They are 
instruments of social engineering. Though similar, Afghanistan and Palestine, the two cases 
discussed below, can also be distinguished by the settler colonial system of the latter. The 
differences reveal contrasting political uses of the roads. 
Afghanistan has only about 7,500 miles of paved road. Given the vastness of the country, 
this is a tiny number. Since 2002, the U.S. military and other donors (including USAID and 
NATO) have built around 2,000 of these miles. In Afghanistan, the U.S. military leaders 
considered roads so significant to their fight against the Taliban that the vast majority of the 
emergency funds of local commanders (nearly $900 million out of a total of $1.3 billion) were 
spent on road construction. In many instances, these roads are either continuations or restorations 
of routes originally built by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the 1960s (as Cold War 
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infrastructure) or extended by the Russians after 1980. The new roads paid for by the U.S. 
connect the largest cities to supply routes within Afghanistan, while the Iranian government 
constructed the Herat-Mashhad road to facilitate trade and pilgrimage between the two countries. 
As Kilcullen wrote in the Small Wars Journal blog in 2008:  
Like the Romans, counterinsurgents through history have engaged in road-building as a 
tool for projecting military force, extending governance and the rule of law, enhancing 
political communication, and bringing economic development, health, and education to 
the population. Clearly, roads that are patrolled by friendly forces or secured by local 
allies also have the tactical benefit of channeling and restricting insurgent movement and 
compartmenting terrain across which guerrillas could otherwise move freely. But the 
political impact of road-building is even more striking than its tactical effect. 
By connecting far-flung habitations to administrative centers and easing transportation 
between sites of production and markets, roads are a means of economic integration. In 
Afghanistan, the U.S. saw roads as a way to strengthen market exposure for farmers and 
pastoralists. The amount by which safer roads lowered the cost of shipping consumer goods even 
became a metric to gauge the effectiveness of a counterinsurgency. The use of trade to quantify 
success indicates the inextricability of counterinsurgency and market economies. 
Tactically, roads can also be used as offensive means of separating the guerrillas from the 
population. Because roads are patrolled, guerrillas often have to leave populated valleys and 
escape to higher altitudes. In the same Small Wars Journal post Kilcullen wrote: 
Instead of being in the villages among the people, the insurgents are now forced up into 
the sparsely populated (often uninhabited) hills. This has political as well as security 
effects: The population gets a visual impression of the enemy firing down into the valley 
(where they live) and the security forces defending the villages, rather than (as 
previously) the enemy living in the villages and the security forces attacking the villages 
to get at the enemy. 
Kilcullen does not mention it, but this division also cuts off the guerrilla forces from the civilians 
who can support them with food and medicine. 
Road building and other logistics projects also tend to consolidate dominant institutions. 
These institutions include not only the nation-state, although the role of the state is enormously 
important. In counterinsurgencies, such projects also reinforce local power constellations that the 
counterinsurgents see as beneficial. Again Kilcullen, in his blog post, is instructive: 
The road project involves a series of negotiated agreements with tribal and district 
elders—the approach the PRT [provincial reconstruction team] is taking is to make an 
agreement with the elders to construct the portion of the road that runs through their tribal 
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territory. This has allowed them to better understand the geographical and functional 
limits of each elder's authority, and to give the people a sense of ownership over the road: 
Since a local workforce has constructed it (and is then paid to protect it), they are more 
likely to defend it against Taliban attacks. Also, the project generates disputes (over 
access, resources, timing, pay, labor etc.) that have to be resolved between tribes and 
community groups, and this allows Afghan government representatives to take the lead in 
resolving issues and negotiating settlements, thereby connecting the population to the 
provincial and local administration and demonstrating the tangible benefits of supporting 
the government. 
This insistence on tribes as the prevalent and legitimate power holders in the region echoes the 
Sandeman system established in 1877 by the British imperial officer Robert Sandeman in 
Baluchistan, in today’s Pakistan. Britain made tribal leaders responsible for the safety of the 
roads from bandits and for the implementation of British colonial policy. The system secured 
tribal leaders’ power over their own tribesmen while making the leaders themselves beholden to 
colonial masters. As a proxy system of rule, the British colonial officials felt this system was less 
costly than direct forms of domination, though colonialists, imperialists, and counterinsurgents 
have debated its effectiveness since Sandeman’s day. 
 
The infrastructure of occupation 
In contrast to the U.S. in Afghanistan, Israel uses roads to isolate residents from the global 
market, nearby Palestinian communities, and neighboring countries. In Palestine, bypass roads 
physically block Palestinians from accessing regional trade networks and main Palestinian cities 
and villages. Israeli-constructed roads connect settlements in the West Bank to each other and to 
transportation networks inside the Green Line—the 1949 armistice line that served as Israel’s de 
facto border until 1967. So far, Israel has built more than 1,000 miles of bypass roads, which are 
primarily used by Israeli settlers and citizens. Unlike the organically developed Palestinian roads, 
these thoroughfares ignore the natural contours of the land and blow through hills and farmland 
to connect Israeli settlements to cities inside the Green Line. Since settlements are central to the 
military strategies of the Israeli state (as outposts overlooking Palestinian habitations), these 
roads linking them serve to facilitate surveillance and control of Palestinians. 
The security of these roads is considered so paramount that, in many instances, 
Palestinians on Palestinian roads that intersect the bypass roads are not allowed to cross. Even 
where the checkpoints, earth-mounds, roadblocks, and fences can be negotiated quickly, 
avoiding a bypass road can add 10-25 miles to a trip that is a quarter that length. 
The bypass roads are meant to ensure the security of settlers in the West Bank by 
allowing them unrestricted and swift mobility and providing quick access to security and military 
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forces. Furthermore, the roads partition the West Bank into variegated areas with different access 
regimes: Areas A, B, and C, as well as seam zones, free-fire zones, and a whole series of other 
politically differentiated areas result in vast bureaucracies with confusing permit regimes that 
restrict the movement of Palestinians. 
These roads expropriate Palestinian land. According to UNDP, over 40,000 acres has 
been confiscated from Palestinians to make way for these roads, which often cut through olive 
groves and result in the destruction of agriculture and communities. Israeli law usually only 
allows for the seizure under rules of military necessity (which have been extensively challenged 
in court). Thus as in many other instances, Israeli law has drawn on subsumed laws of historic 
states preceding it in Palestine to implement changes its post-1948 laws would not allow. In the 
case of bypass roads, the Israeli state has used the Jordanian equivalent of eminent domain 
legislation, which had been in effect in the West Bank prior to 1967, to lay claim to territory, 
arguing that in this case Jordanian law is in force in the West Bank.  
In Palestine, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, road building employs locals in sites of internal 
or civil conflict, thus co-opting some segment of the population into the system of economic 
reproduction. This employment process—often drawing on ethnic, national, or linguistic 
difference—allows for the processes of divide-and-rule to control the populations. In the case of 
the bypass roads, the Israeli Ministry of Transport employs Palestinians in dire financial need to 
work on the roads’ construction. These labor regimes not only incorporate the population into 
new work regimes, they also make it beholden to the existing regimes of power. 
 
Circulation 
In his reflection on the development of security regimes as fundamental elements of the nation-
state, the theorist Michel Foucault emphasizes the importance of circulation to the police. 
Foucault doesn’t just mean material transportation networks; he focuses on “circulation itself, 
that is to say, the set of regulations, constraints, and limits, or the facilities and encouragements 
that will allow the circulation of men and things.” 
“From this,” he writes, “stem those typical police regulations, some of which seek to 
suppress vagrancy, others to facilitate the circulation of goods in this or that direction, [and] 
others that want to prevent qualified workers from leaving their place of work, or especially the 
kingdom. After health and the objects of bare necessity, after the population itself, this whole 
field of circulation will become the object of police.”  
As such, roads (and logistics provision more generally) create the raison d'être of the state 
and its security apparatus.   
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Circulation is so central to capitalism that the whole of Marx’s second volume of Capital 
and good bits of the third volume, as well as his Grundrisse, are dedicated to reflections on “the 
annihilation of space by time”—or the ability of mechanical modes of transportation and 
communication to accelerate the delivery of goods to market. Roads—built on grounds whose 
ownership is sometimes in the hands of the state, but increasingly in those of corporations (or a 
combination of the two)—facilitate transportation and communication (as often telegraph, 
telephone, and internet cables are laid alongside roadsides). Roads are therefore embodiments of 
the circulation of commodities and capital par excellence. And every road built by an imperial 
power reinforces the economic system advanced by that power. This fungibility between 
infrastructures for capital accumulation and those for fighting wars remains fundamental to our 
era. This infrastructural power allows extraction, circulation, and accumulation. And so very 
often its origins lie in the waging of war. 
This article is based on a lecture given on April 18, 2016 at Georgetown University. 
 
